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.From his arrival in Sicily onwards Scipio bent his energies to developing a superior cavalry, and Zama, where Hannibal’s decisive weapon was turned against himself, is Scipio’s justification.How unattainable must this goal have seemed when he landed in Sicily with a mere seven thousand heterogeneous volunteers.Yet within a few days the first progress was recorded.At once organising his volunteers into cohorts and centuries, Scipio kept aside three hundred of the pick.One can imagine their perplexed wonder at being left without arms and not told off to centuries like their comrades.Next he nominated three hundred of the noblest born Sicilian youths to accompany him to Africa, and appointed a day on which they were to present themselves equipped with horses and arms.The honour of nomination for such a hazardous venture affrighted both them and their parents, and they paraded most reluctantly.Addressing them, Scipio remarked that he had heard rumours of their aversion to this arduous service, and rather than take unwilling comrades he would prefer that they would openly avow their feelings.One of them immediately seized this loophole of escape, and Scipio thereupon released him from service and promised to provide a substitute on condition that he handed over his horse and arms and trained his substitute in their handling.The Sicilian joyfully accepted, and the rest, seeing that the general did not take his action amiss, promptly followed his example.By this means Scipio obtained a nucleus of picked Roman cavalry “ at no expense to the State.”His next measures show not only how his every step tended towards his ultimate object, but also how alive he was to the importance of foresight in securing his future action.He sent Lælius on an advance reconnoitring expedition to Africa, and in order not to impair the resources he was building up repaired his old ships for this expedition, hauling his new ones upon shore for the winter at Panormus, as they had been hastily and inevitably built of unseasoned timber.Further, after distributing his army through the towns, he ordered the Sicilian States to furnish corn for the troops, saving up the corn which he had brought with him from Italy—economy of force even in the details of supply.Scipio knew that strategy depends on supply, that without security of food the most dazzling manoeuvres may come to nought.Furthermore, an offensive, whether strategical or tactical, must operate from a secure base—this is one of the cardinal axioms of war.“Basis” would perhaps be a better term, for “ base ” is apt to be construed too narrowly, whereas truly it comprises security to the geographical base, both internal and external, as well as security of supply and of movement.Napoleon in 1814, the Germans in 1918, both suffered the dislocation of their offensive action through the insecurity of their base internally.It is thus interesting to note how Scipio sought among his preparatory measures to ensure this security.He found Sicily, and especially Syracuse, suffering from internal discontent and disorder which had arisen out of the war.The property of the Syracusans had been seized after the famous siege by covetous Romans and Italians, and despite the decrees of the Senate for its restitution, had never been handed back.Scipio took an early opportunity of going to Syracuse, and “ deeming it of the first importance to maintain trust in Rome’s plighted word,” restored their property to the citizens, by proclamation and even by direct action against those who still clung fast to the plundered property.This act of justice had a wide effect throughout Sicily, and not only ensured the tranquillity of his base but won the active support of the Sicilians in furnishing his forces for the expedition.Meanwhile Lælius had landed at Hippo Regius (modern Bona), about 150 miles distant from Carthage.According to Livy the news threw Carthage into a panic, the citizens believing that Scipio himself had landed with his army, and anticipating an immediate march on Carthage.To ward this off seemed hopeless, as their own people were untrained for war, their mercenary troops of doubtful loyalty, and among the African chiefs Syphax was alienated from them since his conference with Scipio, and Masinissa a declared enemy.The panic did not abate until news came that the invader was Lælius, not Scipio, and that his forces were only strong enough for a raid.Livy further tells us that the Carthaginians took advantage of the respite to send embassies to Syphax and others of the African chiefs for the purpose of strengthening their alliance, and envoys were also sent to Hannibal and Mago to urge them to keep Scipio at home by playing on the fears of the Romans.Mago had, earlier, landed at Genoa, but was too weak to act effectively, and to encourage him to move towards Rome and join Hannibal, the Carthaginian Senate sent him seven thousand troops and also money to hire auxiliaries.If these facts be true, they would on the surface suggest that Scipio lost an opportunity and was unwise to put the Carthaginians on their guard by this raid of Lælius’s, and this impression is strengthened by the words ascribed to Masinissa.For Livy says that Masinissa came, with a small body of horse, to meet Lælius, and complained that “ Scipio had not acted with promptness, in that he had not already passed his army over into Africa, while the Carthaginians were in consternation, and while Syphax was entangled in wars with neighbouring States, and in doubt as to the side he should take; that if Syphax was allowed time to settle his own affairs, he would not keep faith with the Romans.” Masinissa then begged that Lælius would urge Scipio not to delay, promising that he, though driven from his kingdom, would join Scipio with a force of horse and foot.When, however, we appreciate the situation from a military angle it appears in a different light.Lælius landed at the port which was nearest to Numidia, and which was not only 150 miles distant from Carthage, but with a wide belt of hill country intervening.When Scipio himself landed it was at a spot only some twentyfive miles distant.Hence Lælius’s expedition can have been in no sense a reconnaissance against Carthage, and the clear deduction is that it was a reconnaissance to discover the state and feeling of the African States where Scipio hoped to find allies, and in particular to get in touch with Masinissa.As we have shown, Scipio had realised that a superiority in the cavalry arm was the key to victory over the Carthaginians, and he looked to the Numidian chief for his main source.His appreciation of the latter’s brilliant cavalry leadership on the battlefields of Spain had inspired him to win Masinissa over.Thus the inherent probability is that Lælius’s mission was primarily to discover if the Numidian would actually hold to his new alliance when Roman troops landed on African soil, and if so, what were the resources he could contribute.If the Carthaginians were really panic-stricken at a raid so distant, the fact but helped to confirm Scipio’s view of the moral advantage to be gained from a thrust at Carthage.As for the warning thus given, the danger of putting the Carthaginians on their guard, this had already been given by Scipio’s speeches in the Senate and his preparations.Where consent for his expedition had to be wrung from a reluctant Senate, where the forces and resources for it had to be raised without State help, strategic surprise was out of the question from the outset.Here were exemplified the chronic drawbacks of a constitutional system of government for conducting war.It is one of Scipio’s supreme merits that he obtained completely decisive results, though lacking the tremendous asset of political control [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]