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.In general, in the natural attitude it is we who are the persons carrying out the investigation; and thus, already in advance, it is we who live alongside one another and with one another.But here, as subjects for the world, we and our life are anonymous—as long as we have not made ourselves thematic for ourselves.Thus the attitude oriented toward nature is precisely: making nature thematic and nothing else; to make thematic is thus in a certain sense at the same time to “abstract,” although this must [not]6 at first (and thus not necessarily) be understood as an active abstracting-from-something but rather, as is usual, only [as]6 an exclusive looking-at-something which consequently notices nothing else.Of course, underlying a scientific attitude oriented toward nature is ultimately a willful making of nature into one’s subject matter—in fact, pure nature, with the conscious exclusion, or will to exclude, everything that is merely subjective.Now the nature that becomes thematic thereby can be the nature of the surrounding world, just as it is pregiven, just as it gives itself in actual and possible experiential perception and establishes itself as actually existing in the course of our experiential life through the harmony of experiences (though with occasional corrections).[Nature’s] being thematic means experiential knowledge, the fixing7 [of nature] through consistent experience—one’s own and that of others, supplemented by the experiential anticipations of mediate inductions—and through description, striving toward descriptive science, the universal descriptive science of nature, encompassing the universe of possible experiences of nature—sense-perception, memory, the induction which is actually verifiable through these—for all time.Underlying this, though not actually developed, is the ontology of the “world of possible experience.” From this8 one can already distinguish the inductive broadening [of experience] through making what is too distant to be experienced homogeneous with what is near, and this leads to the idealization of infinities.The goal of “exact” natural science is a different one, i.e., that of going beyond the relativity of intuited nature, nature relative to the surrounding world, to determine nature “in itself,” as the in-itself which is identical throughout all relativities, through “truths in themselves.” Descriptive nature is relative in the personal, human sense, namely, relative to us, to our nation, to our European civilization, to us earthly men in our historical time; but we ourselves are not thematic here, nor is this relation; the latter needs no thematization insofar as we are, after all, the same earthly human civilization from generation to generation in this unitary historical time or sphere of time; thus, scientific conclusions understandably continue to have validity for us from generation to generation.*We need only direct our thematic gaze toward this relativity in order to recognize that this natural science belongs to the broader content of the personal science of earthly humanity in general, the latter being understood as “we men,” i.e., humanity acquiring its temporal horizon and its relative and (in a broad sense) historical temporality from us who are the investigators.Penetrating more deeply here, we see that European man, arising out of the philosophizing Greeks, was the first to take up the theoretical attitude oriented toward the outermost attainable surrounding world—and that only he could do this.The surrounding world is relative to a subjectivity which functions for it—the typology of functioning subjectivities is itself historical: human beings are necessarily members of generative communities and thus necessarily live in every communal surrounding world as their own surrounding world, in which, in this respect, a universal historicity holds sway.This is not to say, however, that there belongs to every such community a possible theoretical attitude; for this too, and first of all the “descriptive” scientific attitude, is essentially historical.If this attitude has established itself, however, then the development is prescribed, for the further progress of history, from the pure description of nature to psychophysical description.Thus the attitude which is oriented toward men and animals is a new one—toward men and animals not as bodies to be investigated consistently and descriptively in the attitude oriented toward nature but as men (or animals) who have their bodies as living bodies, who have their personal surrounding world, oriented around their living bodies as the near-far world and, at the same time, in the manners of appearing of right-left, up-down—all these manners of appearing standing in a successive relation of dependence to subjective manners of “I move my living body” in a system of kinestheses which can be realized even voluntarily.The thematics of the human being includes what is valid for him as surrounding world, what is valid for him within this surrounding world, both his individual and also the communal surrounding world; the “how” of the appearance of this surrounding world which can be grasped reflectively, not only for him but also for the community; how the manners of appearance belonging to the communicating individuals correspond to one another; how each individual gives his being-human a position in the space of the surrounding world as the zero-point object of the oriented surrounding world in experiential apperception; how, when persons change position, e.g., when two persons exchange positions, the orientations, the same objects, must change or, rather, the manners of appearance must be exchanged.Whereas descriptive nature belongs to the personal surrounding world of all men, or to the surrounding world of all “European” men—and thus belongs within anthropology—exact scientific nature obviously does not belong to this but only to the surrounding world of those men who are exact natural scientists (or who understand natural science).Of course, scientific natural history also does not belong to the surrounding world of every man, insofar as it has taken his general surrounding world under investigation and brought to light what a possible surrounding world might have been like but was not present and is not present, except again for scientists.Natural science is a culture, [and] it belongs only within the cultural world of that human civilization which has developed this culture and within which, for the individual, possible ways of understanding this culture are present [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]